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Cambodia’s economic and social achievements over the past ten years have been the most 
impressive in its history.  Nevertheless, Cambodia today is still as dollarized, if not more so, 
than it was ten years ago. What is this so, and what, if anything, should the Government do? 
This paper attempts to answer both these questions, by examining the reasons behind the 
apparent paradox between a decade of economic and political improvements and continued 
dollarization, and drawing policy implications from it. We advise against pursuing enforced de-
dollarization, and advocate a policy option that focuses instead on accelerating accommodative 
reforms, especially in the financial sector and on legal and institutional reforms.  We also identify 
a host of institutional barriers that need to be overcome to prepare the groundwork for a natural 
process of de-dollarization. 
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 I.   Introduction 
 
 
“For a long time it seemed that the extent of… dollarization was impervious to improved 
economic performance. Now however we have several examples of countries that have 
dedollarized successfully …, including Israel, Poland, Mexico, Egypt, and Turkey. And 
some signs of declining dollarization are evident in Latin American countries where it 
seemed that dollarization was impossible to reverse.” 
 
          Stanley  Fischer  (2006) 
          Governor,  Bank  of  Israel 
 
 
Cambodia has had a spectacular decade. The economic and social achievements over the past 
ten years have been the most impressive in its history. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
has averaged close to 10% over this period, resulting in an almost doubling of income per capita 
(Table 1). Poverty incidence is estimated to have fallen by about 1% per year (from 47% to 35%, 
for the decade up to 2004), even though inequality has worsened (World Bank 2007). 
Consumer price inflation has fallen sharply from an average of 56% over 1990–1998 to an 
average 3.5% over 1998–2007.  Inflation has started rising again recently, with the spike in food 
and energy prices, but this is happening almost everywhere.
1 Government revenue collections 
have recently consistently exceeded expectations, and the budget deficit has fallen to 
manageable levels. The recent discovery of oil and gas could be a significant boon for the 
country, and should provide the resources necessary to address a range of socio-economic 
issues, providing they are not mismanaged.   
 
It is against this backdrop that we find that Cambodia today is still as dollarized, if not more so, 
than it was 10 years ago. The US dollar still serves all three functions of money:  it is widely 
used as a medium of exchange, store of wealth, and unit of account.
2 The IMF estimates the 
share of dollars in currency in circulation at about 90%, little changed from what it was a decade 
ago. The National Bank of Cambodia estimates the share of foreign currency deposits (FCDs) in 
broad money (M2) to have risen to its highest level ever, at 75% in 2006, significantly higher 
than the 54% recorded in 1998 (Table 1). Currently, about 97% of banking deposits are in US 
dollars. 
 
The apparent lack of progress with de-dollarization has led to frustration among a number of 
commentators, some of whom are pressing the government to play a more direct, interventionist 
role. There is growing concern that the process may be irreversible, unless forced. At the 
launching of the Cambodia Economic Forum on 17 January 2006, Finance Minister Keat Chhon 
concluded his opening remarks by stating that “The combination of economic and political 
instability, which is disturbing the world now, requires Cambodia to be more proactive in 
enforcing de-dollarization policy…”. An article in the June 2007 Phnom Penh Post titled “Moves 
to Ban US Dollar”
3 summarizes prevailing sentiments: “Renewed calls to remove the US dollar 
from widespread circulation in Cambodia are drawing bipartisan support, and some high-ranking 
government officials are calling the ban a pressing matter of national sovereignty and pride. The 
move to finally 'de-dollarize' the Cambodian economy has been sidelined for years ...”. The 
                                                  
1  There are also concerns relating to excess liquidity fuelling inflation, and the inability of the National Bank of Cambodia to mop 
this up, because of the lack of monetary instruments as a result of dollarization (see Section 2). 
2  A useful reference on the literature on dollarization is the collection of papers edited by Salvatore et al. (2003). 
3  Phnom Penh Post, Issue 16 / 12, June 15–28, 2007.  3
same article quotes Tioulong Saumura, a Sam Rainsy Party lawmaker: "To de-dollarize is even 
more important now … Decree it. Ban it! This is unthinkable in other places". This frustration is 
indeed understandable.  But is enforced de-dollarization the right choice for Cambodia? 
 
In an article examining the pros and cons of dollarization in Cambodia, and policy options on the 
way forward, Menon (1998) concluded that “…dollarisation is not the problem, but is merely a 
symptom.  The problem (or the cause) is a lack of confidence in the riel, whilst the symptom (or 
the effect) is the use of another currency such as the US dollar.  The causes of the problem 
emanate from an underdeveloped monetary system, political and economic uncertainty, and 
weak legal and institutional structures. These are the problems that need to be addressed 
directly.  When these problems are addressed, then the symptom, which is dollarisation, will 
also cease to be a constraint”. 
 
But political and economic uncertainty has since been significantly reduced; legal and 
institutional structures have improved; and even the monetary system has matured and 
deepened, to some extent.  So, why is Cambodia still highly dollarized? Why have the 
spectacular economic, political, and other developments over the past decade failed to even 
start the process of de-dollarization? This paper attempts to answer this question, and explain 
the reasons behind the apparent paradox between a decade of economic and political 
improvements and continued dollarization. 
 
The paper is in five parts. Section II examines the reasons behind the recent increase in 
dollarization, by drawing a distinction between so-called “good news” and “bad news” 
dollarization.  We argue that this is part of a transition process, and therefore temporary in 
nature. But what needs to be explained is the longer-term factors underlying the persistence of 
the dollarization phenomenon in Cambodia. In Section III, this persistence is attributed to an 
unfinished reform agenda, as well as inertia and stickiness in the system in the form of 
hysteresis. The unique circumstances surrounding the introduction of dollars into the 
Cambodian economy, combined with a very high level of dollarization, suggests that the 
process of de-dollarization is likely to be more protracted than it would otherwise be. Based on 
these explanations, policy choices are then considered in Section IV. We consider the full 
spectrum of options, ranging from attempts to enforce de-dollarization at one end, to official 
dollarization at the other. In between we have a currency board, monetary union, and a 
“muddling through with accelerated reforms” approach.  A final section concludes. 
 
 
II.  Explaining the Recent Increase in Dollarization: ‘Good News’ versus ‘Bad News’      
            Dollarization 
 
Increasing dollarization is usually attributed to episodes of macroeconomic or political instability. 
So, why has dollarization in Cambodia increased recently, despite the spectacular economic 
achievements of the recent past?  Rather than reversing the process, the current level of 
dollarization may partly be a reflection of the exceptional economic performance itself.   
Increased confidence in the economic and political situation may have been partly responsible 
for the increasing share of FCDs in M2. Large amounts of foreign currency, from both domestic 
and foreign investors, have been flowing in of late. It is an open secret that large amounts of 
foreign currency held by resident and non-resident Cambodians in offshore banks (in Singapore, 
Hong Kong, China etc.) have found their way back recently. Some of these flows have gone into 
real investment, but apparently the bulk has been speculative, in response to, as well as further 
fuelling, land price inflation. The latest World  Investment  Report  from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that the stock of foreign direct  4
investment (FDI) has increased from $38 million in 1990 to $1.6 billion in 2000, to about $3.5 
billion in 2007. The annual inflow in 2007 of $820 million is more than five times the average 
annual inflow for 1990–2000 (Table 1). So, increasing dollarization in this respect reflects 
increasing, rather than decreasing, confidence in the economy.
4  
 
There are other so-called “good news” factors driving increasing dollarization. Cambodia 
became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004, and today is much more 
open and outward-oriented than it was 10 years ago. Trade has flourished, with the export 
share in GDP rising from around 30% in 1998 to about 70% now.  Its trade openness index is 
currently around 120%. In transitional economies especially, almost all trade and capital 
movements involve the use of foreign currency—usually dollars. Even on the financial side, 
there has been rapid growth in monetization (albeit from a low base) and increased financial 
intermediation (also from a low base), but both have contributed to the increase in dollarization.  
There is little doubt, however, that dollarization itself has facilitated financial deepening. 
 
The increase in the share of dollars as a result of these factors should not be a cause for 
concern.  This is because these are essentially quantum or volume effects, and not substitution 
effects. That is, with the volume of riel remaining relatively unchanged, large inflows of dollars is 
simply increasing its share in the aggregate. It is not that people are substituting riel for dollars, 
but that these types of transactions are naturally dollar-based. The fact that dollars continue to 
be regarded as the de facto currency of the country simply reinforces this.  
 
But these “good news” factors are part of a transitory phase.  The process of de-dollarization 
would need to involve a substitution of dollars for riel, and this has not yet started. We turn next 
to examining the longer-term factors that underlie the persistence of dollarization. 
 
 
III.  Explaining the Persistence of Dollarization: Degree of Required Reforms and  
            ‘Hysteresis’ 
 
There are two inter-related factors that explain the persistence of dollarization in Cambodia.  
The first relates to the degree or magnitude of the reforms themselves, and the second relates 
to hysteresis, or the fact that history matters.   
 
Starting with the degree of reforms, the critical point here is not how far Cambodia has 
progressed in the past decade, but rather how much more needs to be achieved. While it is 
clear that Cambodia has come a long way in the last 10 years, and perhaps achieved more than 
most have expected, there is still a lot to be done before underlying uncertainties are 
substantially removed.  While growth has been spectacular, and political uncertainty greatly 
reduced, Cambodia remains a low income country with significant inequality and poverty, and 
some degree of political uncertainly remains.   
 
The greater constraint, however, relates to the level of development of financial, banking, and 
monetary systems, as well as the continued absence of riel-denominated interest-bearing 
assets. Cambodia continues to wrestle with the challenge of developing a viable banking 
                                                  
4  An aspect of this that relates to dollarization is the inability of the National Bank of Cambodia to effectively mop up this excess 
liquidity, due to a lack of monetary instruments. It is increasingly acknowledged that this excess liquidity, in addition to food and 
energy prices, is pushing inflation up at the moment. Changes to reserve requirements can help, but are a blunt instrument in 
this context because dollarization allows capital inflows to become part of the money stock without passing-through the 
financial system. 
  5
system with emphasis on a solid legal and supervisory framework. Unlike many other transition 
economies, Cambodia faces a situation of rebuilding rather than transforming a banking system. 
This is confirmed by surveys that highlight the constraints to greater lending to business by the 
banking sector.  The insufficient lending is often attributed to the: (i) weak credit risk assessment 
capacity of these commercial banks; (ii) unavailability and unreliability of borrower information; 
and (iii) absence of financial contract enforceability (Economic Institute of Cambodia, 2005). 
These are clearly long-term constraints, many of which are endogenous in the sense that they 
depend on progress in other areas, such as the legal system, human resource capacity, and 
overcoming all forms of market failure in the assessment of risk. 
 
While banking system restructuring has made considerable progress, the state-owned Foreign 
Trade Bank retains its role as a key player. Furthermore, lax licensing requirements has led to a 
proliferation of weak joint-venture banks, putting a strain on Cambodia’s supervisory and 
regulatory capacity, and whose problems have hampered the building of confidence in the 
banking system (Unteroberdoerster 2004). As a result, even though monetization has been 
increasing, Cambodia remains largely unbanked.  
 
Many institutions, and laws, have appeared in the last decade, but many more need to emerge. 
A strong foundation for the banking system requires finalization of major pieces of legislation.  In 
this light, it is promising that the Law on Secured Transactions was passed recently. A law on 
government securities and a law on the issuance and trading of nongovernment securities were 
also passed, allowing the Government to issue debt securities and helping set the stage for the 
development of a capital market (ADB 2008). Laws on anti-money laundering and combating 
terrorism financing require urgent attention. There are also important issues relating to the 
implementation of these laws that need to be addressed.  
 
So, in sum, although Cambodia’s economic, social, and political achievements over the past 
decade have been nothing short of spectacular, they have been insufficient to start the process 
of de-dollarization.  Furthermore, monetary and financial reforms have lagged behind, and these 
are arguably more relevant in reversing dollarization. 
 
These issues lead naturally to the second factor—hysteresis.  The concept of hyteresis extends 
all the way from simple inertia to path-dependence to rigid irreversibiities. Basically, it suggests 
that history matters, and that there can be non-linearities, or ‘stickiness’, in the system, that 
should be taken into account in order to understand the process, or its unraveling. The 
circumstances under which Cambodia came to be dollarized are somewhat different from other 
dollarized economies, and this is important in understanding the persistence of dollarization.   
 
Dollarization in Cambodia is the direct legacy of the destruction of economic and financial 
institutions after the 1970s, economic mismanagement in the 1980s, and the large inflows of US 
dollars that occurred during the UNTAC period in the early 1990s. Thus, unlike other countries 
where bouts of macroeconomic instability and hyperinflation induced or increased dollarization, 
the last and determining source of dollarization in Cambodia was a result of an administrative 
and political event. 
  
With the cumulative cost of the UNTAC intervention estimated at a massive $1.7 billion, the 
subsequent level of dollarization was very high.  Large inflows of foreign assistance and private 
transfers, all of them also in dollars, and political and economic uncertainties in the 1990s, have 
kept the level of dollarization at high levels. Cambodia was easily the most highly dollarized 
country in Asia, and one of the highest in the world.  The magnitude and duration of dollarization 
have combined to create significant inertia and path-dependence in the system. In other words,  6
it will take just as much and just as long, if not more of both, before any reversal is likely.  The 
stronger hysteresis effect in Cambodia, compared to either Viet Nam or the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), suggests that the process of de-dollarization will be more 
protracted. 
 
As Fischer (2006) puts it, “Dollarization typically has a long life, generally surviving long after the 
period of instability that gave rise to the phenomenon”. This may be typical, but the special 
circumstances surrounding the introduction of dollars in Cambodia, combined with a high initial 
level of dollarization, implies an even greater level of persistence. In addition to this, and as 
noted earlier, recent “good news” on the economic and financial fronts has actually contributed 
to increasing dollarization, suggesting that the process of reversal is likely to take even longer. If 
all of this is true, then what is required is patience, since high and prolonged dollarization may 
have induced hysteresis, which will take much longer to reverse.  Reacting, through frustration, 
by trying to enforce de-dollarization is then not only unlikely to work, but may be counter-
productive, resulting in an even longer wait for the process of reversal to commence. 
 
There is substantial international evidence to support this call for patience, as evinced in the 
quotation from Fischer (2006) that we presented at the very start. Cambodia too may appear as 
one of those countries where dollarization seems impossible to reverse, at present. But there 
are many examples of successful de-dollarization if patience is combined with a commitment to 
pursue credible economic and financial reforms, and almost as many examples where attempts 
to enforce de-dollarization have failed miserably. 
 
 
IV.  What to Do? 
 
As noted in the introduction, there are growing calls in Cambodia for enforcing de-dollarization. 
The sentiments underlying these views are probably driven by a belief that: (i) the time is ripe for 
de-dollarization; and (i) dollarization has more costs than benefits. 
 
The second point may well be right. Kang (2005) estimates the loss in seigniorage to be $682 
million at the end of 2004, with an additional $61 million lost annually.  Although this estimate is 
broadly consistent with the international evidence, which points to an annual loss amounting to 
about 2% of GDP, it is likely to be an underestimate in Cambodia because a significant, but 
undetermined, amount of foreign currency flows are unrecorded.  Furthermore, there is the 
almost complete loss of monetary policy autonomy.  This constraint is evident at present, with 
the US Federal Reserve running an expansionary monetary policy at a time when Cambodia 
needs tightening to curtail growing inflationary pressures. Even if we ignore the monetary policy 
constraint and unrecorded flows, the estimated seigniorage loss alone may well outweigh the 
benefits flowing from greater price stability, reduced exchange rate volatility, and other forms of 
macro policy credibility. But these benefits are even more difficult to quantify than the costs. 
Nevertheless, even if the costs do indeed outweigh the benefits, does this then mean that the 
time is ripe? In essence, this is akin to asking if enforced de-dollarization will be an improvement 
on the current situation. The international evidence would suggest otherwise (see Menon 2008).   
 
Indeed, there is no need to look to Cuba, Liberia, or Russia to demonstrate the difficulties 
associated with attempting to enforce de-dollarization. A glance across the border to Lao PDR is 
sufficient. When the Bank of the Lao PDR moved to enforce Decree No. 53 in June 2007, 
stipulating that only the kip can be used as a medium of exchange in all domestic transactions, 
the result was counter-productive.  The depreciation of the kip that followed actually reduced its 
value share in the money stock (see Menon 2007).  In sum, it is not sufficient to demonstrate  7
that the costs of dollarization outweigh the benefits; proponents of enforced de-dollarization 
have to also show that their so-called solution will be an improvement on the status-quo.  All the 
international evidence suggests that this is highly unlikely.  
 
If enforcement is not the answer, and the costs outweigh the benefits, what then should be 
done? There is a spectrum of policy options available, bounded by enforcement at one end, and 
official dollarization on the other, and in between lie currency board arrangements (CBAs) and 
the muddling through approach.
5 
 
Let’s start with official dollarization.  A number of Latin American countries, such as Ecuador, El 
Salvador and Panama, have chosen to officially adopt the US dollar as their currency.  Most of 
these countries have had quite stable inflation rates subsequently, and Panama in particular is 
often hailed as a success story of formal dollarization.  Given the high level of dollarization in 
Cambodia, could this be a feasible option? This is unlikely for a number of reasons.  First, unlike 
the Latin American countries that have chosen official dollarization, Cambodia is not that closely 
integrated with the US economy. The US has also been unwilling to return seigniorage 
revenues to countries that formally dollarize. Thus, whatever seigniorage revenues that are 
currently being earned will be lost under official dollarization.  But the main obstacle standing in 
the way of official dollarization is a political one. The government is unlikely to consider this 
option seriously because they are politically committed to reversing dollarization, and so are 
unlikely to go in the opposite direction. 
 
Moving along the spectrum, let’s consider CBAs next. A CBA is close to official dollarization, but 
there are important differences. First, it is less rigid in that devaluation is possible. Second, it 
would reinstate seigniorage when official dollarization would remove it completely. Although 
Hong Kong, China is perhaps the most well-known economy employing a currency board, a 
number of less well-known, newly-independent transitional economies such as Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Bosnia have implemented currency board-like systems with success, having their 
local currencies anchored to the Euro.
6  
 
How feasible is a CBA for Cambodia? At the moment, official reserves cover about three times 
the amount of riel in circulation at present exchange rates.  Although this may sound impressive, 
the fact remains that most estimates place the share of foreign currency in circulation at 
between 85 to 95% (de Zamarocksy and Sa 2002). Taking the mid-point of these estimates, this 
implies that the riel constitutes only about 10% of currency in circulation.  To recoup the foreign 
currencies in circulation at present would thus require a tripling in the amount of official reserves.  
Without substantially increasing government borrowings, most of which would have to come 
from abroad, this appears to be a binding constraint.
7 
 
Thus, although CBAs may provide an attractive alternative, either interim or permanent, to the 
current situation, implementing such an arrangement appears to be beyond the financial 
capacity of Cambodia at present. 
                                                  
5  Another option involves a single currency or monetary union. This option is considered in detail in Menon (2008). Based on that 
analysis, it would appear that this is not a feasible option for Cambodia or its neighbors at present, since any feasible 
configuration fails to meet the criteria of an optimal currency area. 
6  Argentina had a currency board-like system anchored to the US dollar up until 2002, and many Caribbean states continue to 
employ a dollar-anchored CBA. 
7  This assumes that the foreign currencies in circulation are held for transaction purposes, or to serve the medium of exchange 
function. Some share of foreign currencies in circulation may be held to serve the store of value function, given low confidence 
in the domestic banking system. This share would not have to be recouped in implementing the CBA. Although the precise 
amount that this share constitutes is unknown, it is unlikely to be substantial enough to alter the conclusion that implementing a 
CBA in these countries will be financially demanding on governments.    8
This brings us finally to the “muddling-through but accelerating reforms” option. This involves 
the minimum amount of direct intervention, but maximum indirect changes in policy and reform 
measures. That is, with this approach, the current monetary arrangements are left as they are, 
but the focus shifts to accommodative policy reform. The macroeconomic situation must 
continue to improve as it has over the past decade, and the return of stability has to be a 
permanent feature of the political landscape.  These are minimum requirements in the long-term 
challenge of reversing dollarization.   
 
But more will be needed.  For instance, it is critical that the key medium-term challenges 
identified in the Financial Sector Development Strategy 2006–2015, such as increasing 
intermediation, strengthening the links between banking and microfinance, and improving 
overall financial institution operations, are addressed. Macroeconomic stability will also be 
crucial in restoring confidence in the riel.  The role that macroeconomic reform can play in 
reversing dollarization is easily illustrated by tax policy reform. A significant portion of the 
demand for riel is related to tax payments, since they need to be made in riel.  The revenue 
base from tax collections is likely to increase, particularly in the context of sustained economic 
growth, as a result of: (i) fiscal reforms, including broadening of the tax base; (ii) improvements 
to tax collection mechanisms; and (iii) policies designed to curb tax avoidance. This will directly 
increase the demand for riel, as well as fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability.  All of 
these will contribute to the process of de-dollarization.   
 
These are the so-called ‘big ticket’ macro, political and financial issues that need to be 
addressed. There are a host of other institutional barriers that need to be dismantled, which 
currently adds to the differences, both perceived or real, between dollars and riel. These stand 
in the way of a gradual process of de-dollarizing, and some have been in place for decades now.  
These include the preference given to US dollars in the payment of wages to non-public sector 
workers.  The fact that the Labour Law continues to define the minimum wage in US dollars 
exemplifies this preference.  Another example is that international aid organizations and 
nongovernment organizations tend to pay their staff solely in US dollars in Cambodia, when in 
other countries organizations such as the UN tend to pay a minimum of 30% of salaries in the 
currency of the home country.  A useful step in setting up the pre-conditions for de-dollarizing 
would be to remove this favored status of US dollars in the payment of wages. It goes without 
saying that government salaries should be paid in riel, even if indexed to a US dollar amount to 
ensure its purchasing power. 
  
In essence, institutional constraints preventing greater use of the riel, when there is demand for 
it, should be removed.  Another example relates to microfinance agencies who often complain 
of a physical lack of riel to cater to their lending requirements for small borrowers. It is estimated 
that the microfinance industry alone will require Riel 120 billion in 2008, and that amount is more 
than what is available in the market.
8 Apparently the restricted supply of riel is to avoid any 
further depreciation in its value against the dollar. If there is demand for more riel for lending 
purposes, then this concern would appear to be misplaced.  
 
In sum, rules and regulations, whether implicit or explicit, that favor the use of US dollars are 
just as detrimental as those that impose the use of the riel in terms of the long-run objective of 
de-dollarizing. These can, and should, be removed immediately. Sustaining and building upon 
the macroeconomic and political achievements of the past decade, combined with renewed 
urgency in completing the reform agenda on the financial, legal, and institutional sides, will 
                                                  
8  Quoted in “Microfinance needs more Riel to lend: Phnom Penh Post, 17 December, 2007.  9




V. Concluding  Remarks 
 
Cambodia has come a long way in the past ten years.  The economic achievements in particular, 
but also political, legal and institutional reforms, have surpassed the expectations of most 
commentators. With these achievements, many have expected that a process of de-
dollarization would have been set in train by now.  Instead, what we see is an increase in 
dollarization over this period. This has understandably led to frustration, and increasing calls for 
more interventionist action.  In particular, there have been calls for government to try to enforce 
de-dollarization. 
 
In this paper, we have tried to explain the recent increase in dollarization, as well as the 
apparent delay in the process of de-dollarization in Cambodia. We argued that the recent 
increase is part of a transition process, being driven by so-called “good news” rather than “bad 
news” factors. This is likely to be temporary in nature, and no cause for alarm. What is more 
worrying to some is the persistence of the dollarization phenomenon in Cambodia, or its 
apparent irreversibility.  We attribute this persistence to an unfinished reform agenda, as well as 
inertia and stickiness in the system in the form of hysteresis. The unique circumstances 
surrounding the introduction of dollars into the Cambodian economy, combined with a very high 
level of dollarization, suggests that the de-dollarization process is likely to be more protracted 
than it would otherwise be. It is not that it is irreversible without direct intervention; it will just 
take more time. 
 
For these reasons, any drastic policy action, such as attempts to enforce de-dollarization, is not 
only likely to fail, but could prove counter-productive. Since the costs of dollarization appear to 
exceed the benefits, some action is warranted. One option is formal dollarization, but this is 
politically unpalatable, as well as economically questionable.  Another is the adoption of a 
currency board, but this too appears premature, if not financially unfeasible at present.  
 
We therefore advocate a policy option that does not directly interfere with monetary 
arrangements, but focuses instead on accelerating accommodative reforms, especially in the 
financial sector and on legal and institutional reforms.  We also identify a host of institutional 
barriers that need to be overcome to prepare the groundwork for a natural process of de-
dollarization. 
 
It would be foolish to predict that this policy prescription would lead to de-dollarization within the 
next decade.  It is unclear how long it will take, and it may well take longer. But it will happen, 
naturally, as it has in Indonesia, Israel, Poland, Mexico, Egypt, and Turkey (to name just a few) 
and as it is happening next door in Viet Nam. Based on international evidence and an 
understanding of the Cambodian context, however, one thing is clear: trying to enforce de-
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Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic and Monetary Indicators, 1998–2007 
 
  98–07 
Ave  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GDP growth, %  9.3  5.0  12.6  8.4  7.7 6.9 8.5  10.0 13.5 10.8  9.6
a/ 
Per capita income growth, %  5.5  -2.4 4.2 5.0 3.3 3.6 6.7 8.2  11.2 8.2  7.2 
Inflation, % per year  3.8  12.6  0.0 0.5 0.3 3.3 1.2 3.8 5.9 4.7  5.9 
Budget deficit, % of GDP  4.9  5.5  3.9 5.3 6.6 6.4 6.7 4.6 3.4 3.0  3.2 
FDI,  $mil  252 121 144 112 142 139  74 121 375 475  820 




a/ ADB estimate from Asian Development Outlook 2008. 
b/ data from National Bank of Cambodia. 
 
Sources:  
Asian Development Outlook, various issues.  
IMF Country Reports, various issues.  
National Bank of Cambodia. 
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